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UR existing pattern of air routes has been the subject of frequent
criticism by many groups and individuals including myself. Certainly as one views it in the broad it possesses many elements of weakness. These are, in the main, two-inherently weak routes and the
integration bf routes into weak systems.

It certainly was the intent of the Civil Aeronautics Act (Act) to
avoid the development of such a situation. We had been through it
in the case of the railroads, and the railroad situation was and still is
bedevilled by this problem. The powers conferred upon the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) were conferred with the aim of preventing
a repetition of exactly that situation, and yet it has repeated itself.
There is no question about that. The profit and loss statements of
the airlines speak more loudly than I can. So that it has become time
to look the facts in the face and see what we can do about them.
A partial cause for this situation lay in the fact that the new governmental agency under the Act did not have a clean slate upon which
to write. The existing lines were given grandfather rights and became
permanently entitled to fly the routes that they had pioneered. Most
of these were initiated under the supervision of the Post Office. Its
planning in this respect was both good and bad, leaving the overall
national situation in a piebald condition. Some weakness prevailed
where local pressure ran away with wise judgment. But, as a whole,
the recognition of grandfather rights was not too serious a setback to
the development of an adequate air, transportation system.
The real difficulties began with the Act. The first and greatest of
them lies in its mail pay provisions. Few people on the outside seem
to be familiar with the theory of mail pay. Yet an understanding of
it is bisic to practically everything in commercial aviation.

for
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Act
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It was recognized by the Congress that some subsidy was 'essential
the development of air transportation. The idea of subsidy was
new; it was present from the start. But the approach of the 1938
was new, for as it has been interpreted, the Congress authorized
CAB to guarantee in perpetuity, according to the viewpoint of

* Address delivered before The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, April 12, 1948.
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my former colleagues, mail pay sufficient to provide a fair return on
any system that the CAB decided that it was desirable to fly in the
interest of public convenience and necessity.
The largeness of that guaranty may not be apparent on its face.
But when you examine it, I doubt whether you will find an equivalent power committed to any other public agency. For it in substance gives the Board a blank check to string air routes across the
face of the United States as well as the world without regard to the
financial burdens that this may entail, limited only by the Board's
conception of public convenience and necessity.
There are, of course, a few other limiting conceptions, but very
few. There is the limiting conception of honest and efficient management, namely, that Congress does not obligate itself to reimburse management for corruption and stupidity-a concept difficult to apply in
practice. There is the practical limitation that too extraordinary a
bill might so shock the Committee on Appropriations as to induce the
Congress to renege upon the pledges that it authorized its agent, the
CAB, to make. There is the limitation inherent, I believe, in the
concept of public convenience and necessity, namely, that public
desirability must be weighed against public cost, but this concept,
innately incapable of mathematical application, seems to have little
strength as witness the Board's continued authorization of Chicago
& Southern's New Orleans-Havana flights and its recent authorization
of the extension of those flights to Caracas. Never in history has the
public been asked to pay so much for so little.
But other than these, there are no limitations. There is no budget
in the light of which the cost of present operations and contemplated
expenditures needs to be measured. Indeed, as regards present net
revenue, the recent annual statements of most of the airlines are meaningless, for petitions for revised rates are pending and most of the
airlines are operating under temporary, really tentative, rates far
below what they are entitled to receive, not only for the future but for
some time in the past. And if a move now being' sponsored by some
of the carriers for so-called retroactive rates, that is, rates higher than
those under which they were operating without the slightest complaint,
succeeds, operations both for the past and for the future may be put
upon a cost plus basis.
There is no limitation to the effect that mail pay will be available
only on those routes that the Post Office wants to have flown. Indeed,
under the law the Post Office can be required to meet the costs of
flying both routes and schedules that it deems utterly useless for
postal needs.
There is not even the limitation that this largess authorized to be
paid to a holder of a certificate can ever be effectively stopped despite
whatever original misjudgment may have occurred in its issuance, or
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whatever changed factors may characterize the operation. My own
view is that, since public convenience and necessity was the basis for
the issuance of a certificate, the absence of public convenience and
necessity should be ground for its termination. But this view was
opposed by my colleagues and found no favor with the President's
Air Policy Commission (PAPC). As the New Yorker has recently
remarked, "God rest ye, merry taxpayers."
These consequences thait by law attached to the initiation or extension of air routes, attracted little attention between 1938 and 1946.
Those years remind of the years 1924 to 1929 in the stock market.
Then any bet on the long side was good, and similarly from 1938 to
1945, any extension of any air route seemed to be wise. And it was
in this period that the doctrines involving new routes and extensions
were evolved.
This leads me to my second point regarding the manner of building air routes under the Act. If circumstances enable one conveniently to forget the financial implications involved by the creation of'
an air route, it may be possible to turn the question over to the
lawyers for handl ing through the litigious processes of notice and
hearing and the like. This, at least, was what the Act did. It built
imitatively upon the techniques present in the Interstate Commerce
Act dealing with the extension and abandonment of railroads, forgetting that in that field the driving force was private initiative and the
willingness of private groups to gamble for profits and to absorb losses,
while in the air transport field there were to be no losses-just subsidy.
A friend of mine, counsel for one of the larger airlines, has recently examined all the decisions of the Board in this field. He has
been grieved to find that they lack a doctrinaire consistency-and
he has rightly found my decisions to fit within that category. But I
think he has misconceived the basic nature of the function underlying
-or at least that should underlie-the Board's actions in route grants.
Like a hundred others at the Civil Aeronautics Bar he has treated it,
under the drive of the statute, as a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
But, whatever the statute may say, it is not that. It is, in fact, an
underwriting or banking function with two differences. The first is
that the bonds need not be sold, and the second is that the measurement of return must include but must not be limited to dollars and
cents.
This latter fact is important. National defense, the stimulation oi
commerce, the postal service (which can rightly be a source of profits°s
as well as losses) are all elements of the public return. But basically.i
it is an issue of return versus investment and, as such, amenable to
the banking or underwriting technique rather than the legal one. If
we look at it in this fashion, what real reason exists for sticking to a
record perhaps two years old when more pertinent and reliable facts
are to be found outside the record?
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The only reason that suggests itself, apart from the vested interest
of lawyers in their own tactics, is the danger of the misconstruction
of facts not subjected to cross-examination and the existence of undue
pressures not openly presented and articulated.
The first seems to me an ungenerous comment upon the techniques
of professions other than the law to arrive at reasonably correct solutions. Both from the standpoint of public influence and private profit,
the decisions of, say, Morgan, Stanley & Company or Dillon & Reed,
have wide significance. Beyond calling, under the Securities Act, for
the basic facts upon which they rest, we permit them to have their
influence and rely upon them for building up empires of steel or
chemicals or chewing gum. Their inherent rightness is, perhaps, as
much to be trusted as similar judgments by a quasi-judicial tribunal.
The second problem-that of undue pressure-is a diffcult problem.
But no quasi-judicial tribunal in my experience has been immune
from such pressures. The forms of law clearly help to reduce the
power of their impact, but they do not eliminate them. The real
barrier against them lies in the traditions and ideals of the personnel
entrusted with the responsibility of administration. The development
of these barriers is made much more difficult, for example, in the CAB
than most other agencies, for the clientele there is limited and airlines
once admitted to the inner sanctum of certification ally themselves
through a powerful and costly lobby against anyone on the outside.
The present tactics employed in the Air Freight and Air Freight Forwarder Cases are perfect illustrations of this.
It is the process that interests me, for no one can be happy with
the results that have thus far been produced. Let me take, for example, as an illustration the problem of feeder routes in a so-called area
case. The area to start with is a country in itself, larger than France
or Germany or the Argentine. It is already criss-crossed by a number
of trunk routes. Plans for intermediate or feeder routes of varying
kinds have been presented. Statistics on population, their peregrinating habits, even the number of fire-plugs, are available. Cost data of
the most primitive type is all that has been offered, but lawyers' briefs
in abundance are at hand. And from this mass of material a group
of men whose acquaintance with the territory may be negligible are
supposed without consultation to devise a plan of airline operation
that will not only meet the needs of the area, but also be a feasible one
to operate. The task, to be properly performed, calls for knowledge
not merely about various communities of interest within the area, but
*airport conditions, types of available equipment, ship utilization and
ship distribution, air navigation facilities, and a hundred and one other
things. And the result of that judgment may cost the taxpayer $1,500,000 or more a year for at least three years and probably longer. Would
any other nation build their airlines this way? Would we devise a
scheme for the development of a river basin in this fashion?
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A more sensible approach to me would be to determine first what
area could profit from such a service, what applicant or applicants
among the many could best be trusted with the presentation of a plan,
call for these plans, determine which one shows the most promise and,
in the light of that, after free and unhindered consultation, promulgate
the scheme. At that time the interested communities could be called
upon to give their views and such modifications could then be made as
might be deemed desirable. But the legalistic approach called for by
the Act makes such a technique impossible.
The same technique is equally adaptable to the extension of trunk
routes. The problem there again is a twofold one-the needs of the
various systems and the needs of the communities. I have put them
in this order, because I believe they come in this order, for, if the
systems are adequate, the needs of the communities can be met.
When I was with the Board, I had the opportunity to inaugurate
a series of studies on the weaker carriers with the aim of getting some
knowledge of their weaknesses, whether these weaknesses lay in route
patterns or management, and what could be done about them. But
the legal traditions immediately seized upon that effort. Instead of
studies, they had to be investigations. And competitors under the whip
of their lawyers insisted we could not benefit from these studies or
utilize them in route or rate decisions, unless they could be mercilessly
torn to pieces by cross-examination. The result, i gather, is that these
investigations have now been buried, because their handling has become too difficult, too likely to create "error" for some gowned tribunal
to pounce upon. And yet what more sensible way is there to approach
this problem. The United States has underwritten these systems and
it must continue to perform the underwriter's function-liquidate at
the best figure or else make it possible to operate at a reasonable cost.
The emphasis upon communities comes second. I say this deliberately and with the public interest at heart, for the public interest
is not served, as the residents of Long Island or Vermont can testify,
by poor transportation facilities. To weaken a system internally by
extending a new airline into its territory, when an exchange of trackage
and air rights will adequately meet the needs of the communities, is
wrong. Or to refuse to extend a system into territory of a competitor,
when the competitor can stand it and the extension is absolutely necessary, is equally wrong despite the fact that more service is not required by the communities involved. The efficiency of the systems
is the heart of route planning.
There may well be too many systems, and means must be found for
their better integration. As the history of the railroads abundantly
illustrates, some propulsive force from outside is necessary if real progress is to be made. This is more markedly true in the airlines where
frequently the competition is less -between systems than personalities
-personalities as colorful and ambitious as any that our railroad his-
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tory developed. In the Route 68 case, I thought it possible within
the Act to find such a force in control over the bases of exchange
and sale, but my colleagues thought otherwise. But so long as mail
pay remains what it is, the price of an inefficient system will remain
too high to permit reasonable integration with another system, and
the program of merger and consolidation will remain at a standstill.
Criticism of the air route system developed by this adversary,
litigious process too frequently directs its barbs towards the result and
not the processes which make such a result inevitable. A portion of
the industry alleges too much competition has been introduced: This
is true. Another portion upbraids the Board for introducing too little
competition. This also is true. These are, of course, patent selfserving declarations by the various airlines. They point to certain
facts but produce no answers. Nor has an answer to this problem been
forthcoming. The PAPC's suggestion that an overall national plan
should be evolved puts the cart, I believe, before the horse. The most
productive answer, in my judgment, is to think and plan in terms of
systems. If plans could be evolved for the future of Northeast, Colonial, Pennsylvania Central, Continental-to mention a few-in the
light of available traffic resources-plans calling for expansion, contraction, or merger-we might have one foot on the bottom rung of
the ladder. Route issues, on the other hand, are no problem for
systems such as Eastern or American or United. For, except in so far
as these systems have to be expanded to service certain new public
needs, their patterns present no problem. For, if systems such as these
cannot be operated at a reasonable cost, the problem is not routes
but is either management or the rate structure of the whole industry.
The deficiencies of the present adversary process are to be found
not only in the ultimate results. It is time-consuming, and the time
is spent too often on unimportant details. Records so old that they
reflect an earlier era are purported to be the basis for action. And if
the process works as it should, a doctrinaire and not a business judgment is the outcome. We would hardly dare to handle loans from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on this basis, and yet I venture that a more thorough realistic basis underlies the loaning judgment than, say, the extension of Western Air Lines to Mexico City,
Eastern to San Juan, or Chicago and Southern to Kansas City.
Indeed, the remarkable thing is that the process has worked as well
as it has. From the standpoint of community need both nationally
and internationally, there are few gaps in our route pattern so far as
passenger traffic is concerned. Cargo is a horse of a different color.
But system-wise the pattern has its outstanding weaknesses. Systemwise too often it has been traded rather than engineered. Lobbying
directly and indirectly has therefore gained a hold that is worrisome,
and recent events make plain what was heretofore an open secret of
the industry, that advance notice of decisions could be had. But
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these are passing phases. The real difficulty is statutory-a debilitating
mail pay theory and an adversary technique that makes underwriting
judgments difficult to attain.
To evolve a different approach is not easy. But I do think the
Congress is entitled to say to civil aviation what it has said even to
military aviation - prepare and work within a budget. This would involve, in turn, the imposition of budgets, so far as mail pay is concerned, upon the airlines. There would, of course, be bankruptcies
but a commercial world without failures that have to be paid for is
not to be found this side of paradise.
It may be that we can prolong this era of not 'accounting for
results. The threat of war may permit the substitution of a military
for a civil economy. The industry may be able to defer casting up
its accounts until the international peril is over. But, were it not
for this fact, it would be wise for the industry to insist upon some
system of national budgeting before the demand will arise in other
less friendly quarters. There are no figures today of any reliability
with regard to the cost to the taxpayer of the service with which he is
provided. And not even the propaganda of the "dynamics inherent
in air transportation" will forever shut out. an analysis of these facts.
"Wings for a nickel" is nice for the crowd and perhaps as profitable to
the gladiators as the circuses at Rome, but only a proper accounting
would tell the public that the slogan is either true or fundamentally
false.
In a sense the issue of routes for passenger traffic is a dying issue.
Its decease will be mourned by those at the aviation bar who have
trafficked handsomely in it in the past. Rather it is operations that
now comes to the fore. How can we best operate the system that has
been created, is the real question at issue. And this involves the
standing of the different systems, rates, equipment, and safety. But
routes can never quite be forgotten. The development of equipment
alone calls for their constant rewriting. And systems must be brought
to some kind of internal balance. The very shift in the nature of the
problem may forcibly evolve a different type of technique-of planning
rather than adjudication, of less reliance on legal shibboleths and more
attention to the public return to be had from public investment. It
still will require a broad gamble to be made by the public, but after
all these years the extent and nature of that gamble and the portion
of it that the public, as against private groups, should bear ought to
be capable of being made more precise. Otherwise a change in public
temper may dry up not only private but public funds, and a more
serious blow to the future of air transportation cannot be imagined.
An overhauling of the basic concepts of the Act consequently seems
to be demanded. It must go further than the resolution of certain
bureaucratic difficulties, which, I am afraid, is about all that the
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PAPC has suggested in this particular field. Are we still prepared to
give the CAB or some similar agency a blank check, and, if so, is it
wisest to continue to resolve these issues through the building of
records and the haranguing that then ensues? I have acquired my
doubts as to the validity of this method of administration transplanted
to a field where subsidy looms so large and leads to consequences and
attitudes awry with our traditional theories of private enterprise. I
think so more because I have learned to have an appreciation of the
drive and energy and even sacrifice of men in the field of aviation.
The system should reward qualities of that character. But it will do
so only if its policies are sharply black and white and not the dull,
deadening grey of an outworn paternalism.

